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This paper reviews the empirical literature on the choice of exchange rate regime. Prominent 
issues include: (i) the choice based on fundamentals, shocks, financial structure, and political 
ideology; (ii) the “bipolar view” or “hollowing out hypothesis” and its validity; (iii) regime 
choice in emerging economies, and (iv) the discrepancy between declared and actual regime, 
and its consequence on the analysis of currency regime choice. Although much has been learned 
in each approach, this survey highlights the areas of research in which our understanding of 
exchange rate regime transition is still incomplete. Observed data rejects the validity of the 
bipolar view. Moreover, it is seen that a substantial amount of countries diverge from their de 
jure regime without declaration, which needs to be taken into account for drawing a valid 
conclusion on the choice of a regime. From the survey it may be concluded that no empirical 
regularities regarding the choice of a currency regime have emerged yet. 
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1.0  Introduction 
Since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s, countries have adopted 
a variety of exchange rate regimes. Major global and regional events, such as the debt crisis of 
the 1980s, the transformation of the economies of Central and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s, 
the formation of the European Monetary Union in 1999 and financial and currency crises in 
various emerging countries in the late 1990s have influenced exchange rate regime transitions. 
Over the past 35 years since the break down of the Bretton Woods system, economists have 
developed various answers to the choices and consequences of exchange rate regimes. 
                                                 
1 The author is an Assistant Professor of Economics at American International University-Bangladesh (AIUB).   
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In predicting exchange rate regime choice, economic theory alone has been proven to be an 
insufficient guide to policymakers. No single theoretical approach seems to have an 
overwhelming victory over another. For example, while some studies find support for the 
importance of the optimum currency area (OCA) approach, others do not. The same is true when 
using approaches from political economy theories.  
However, the empirical analysis has not provided clear results either. The empirical 
contributions can be broadly grouped into two parts: one that seeks to identify the forces behind 
a particular regime choice and another that seeks to analyze the performance and consequence of 
alternative regimes. This paper surveys empirical contributions only regarding exchange rate 
regime choice.  
Rather than attempting to provide the minute details of each approach, this survey focuses on 
highlighting the essential features of each and indicates the areas of research in which our 
understanding of the mechanism of exchange rate regime transition (choice) is still incomplete 
and the scope of further study to follow. 
 
2.0 The Choice of Exchange Rate Regime 
Traditionally, economists have tried to explain the choice of an exchange rate regime based 
on four factors: economic fundamentals, shocks, financial structure and political ideology. In this 
line of research, mainly OLS, logit and probit models are used as econometric methods. This 
section reviews the works that relate exchange rate regime choice with the above four factors. 
2.1  Economic fundamentals  
Based on Mundell’s (1961) seminal work, the early literature found that the fundamentals 
identified by the OCA approach provide some guidance for observed regime choices  
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(McKinnon, 1963; Heller, 1978; Dreyer, 1978). McKinnon (1963) points to economic size and 
openness as important fundamentals for the choice of a regime. Recently, by analyzing the 
regime choice of 93 countries, Poirson (2001) shows that trade openness, the existence of a 
dominant trading partner, labor mobility and nominal flexibility are associated with a fixed 
regime, while economic development, diversification of production and exports and size of the 
economy are associated with a floating exchange rate regime.  
On the other hand, currency crisis models suggest a large number of endogenous variables 
such as inflation rate, real exchange rate volatility, GDP growth rate, unemployment rate, fiscal 
deficit, level of reserves, growth of domestic credit etc. as some of the determinants of exchange 
rate regime choice. Von Hagen and Zhou (2005) find support for some of the above-mentioned 
variables that may have guided regime choice of a group of 25 Eastern European transition 
economies.  
Although many studies recognize the important role of economic fundamentals on the choice 
of a regime, this role is not always true for the same regime in all studies. For example, Poirson 
(2001) finds that trade openness works for fixed regime choice, but Von Hagen and Zhou (2005) 
finds that its net effect works in the direction of a floating regime for CIS (Commonwealth 
Independent States: States of former Soviet Union) countries. We should observe similar results 
in the cases of small East Asian or Latin American open economies. However, a few cross-
country studies show that macroeconomic fundamentals do not have significant effect on the 
regime choice (see Baxter and Stockman, 1989; Juhn and Mauro, 2002). 
2.2 Shocks 
From the mid 1980s, studies began to focus on the role of shocks in explaining the choice of 
a regime. Following the works of Mundell (1968) and Poole (1970), this line of research  
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incorporates considerations for optimal macroeconomic stabilization, adding proxies for various 
types of shocks (Melvin, 1985; Savvides, 1990). These authors argue that while nominal shocks 
raise the likelihood of a fixed regime, real shocks call for flexibility. Bayoumi and Eichengreen 
(1994) argue that symmetry of shocks is a factor that is necessary for forming an OCA. 
Recent trends in regime transition show that shocks or crises produce only temporary 
transition to an alternative regime and countries often revert to the previous regime after the 
crisis. Some East Asian countries are notable examples of this trend (Hernandez and Montiel, 
2003). However, shocks appear to occur in countries having weak financial institutions. These 
countries often intervene in the market to shield their fledging banking industries in the face of 
large exchange rate movements. This line of reasoning motivates Calvo (1996) to argue for a 
new theory of exchange rate regime choice incorporating the financial structure of a country 
rather than conventional factors, such as the “degree of price rigidity” or the “sources of 
stochastic shocks”. 
2.3 Financial structure 
While some authors have argued that financial sector development could be an important 
determinant of a currency regime choice, one potential difficulty is how to properly measure 
financial sector development. The ratio of broad money to GDP, known as financial deepening 
has been frequently used in literature as a proxy for financial sector development. Nevertheless, 
this is a rough indicator since financial development involves the creation of institutions, market 
deepening and product innovations, which are all difficult to capture in the money-to-GDP ratio. 
Moreover, the existing studies are handicapped by lack of cross-country data on financial sector 
development.  
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In place of the traditional financial deepening index, an index of financial liberalization that 
takes into account interest rate deregulations, removal of credit controls, privatizations, lifting of 
entry barriers, capital account liberalization etc. may better represent financial sector 
development. Note that financial deepening and financial liberalization are not equivalent but 
tend to be related. “Financial deepening affects access to finance, while liberalization affects the 
incentives with which credit is deployed” (Abiad, Oomes, and Ueda, 2004, p. 3). A certain 
degree of financial liberalization is necessary to ensure adequate competition and efficiency of 
the financial sector.  
Financial liberalization generally modifies the domestic interest rate and alters inter-
temporal decisions of firms and individuals and possibly of the public sector. With financial 
liberalization along with capital account liberalization, a country is expected to deploy a 
complementary exchange rate policy as suggested by the impossible trinity doctrine. This 
doctrine states that the choice of exchange rate regime cannot be made independently of the 
choices regarding the degree of international financial integration and the desired level of 
monetary autonomy (see Figure 1).  





     
Fixed Exchange Rate       Independent Monetary Policy 
                            Figure 1. Impossible Trinity  
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With capital account liberalization and fixed exchange rate regime, monetary independence 
is sacrificed. If a country wants to retain monetary independence, it has to accept the flexibility 
of exchange rates. For countries that are imperfectly integrated into global capital markets, an 
intermediate regime may be possible while retaining some degree of monetary independence. 
But some authors argue that countries should avoid unstable combination of capital mobility and 
exchange rate fixity, particularly when domestic financial markets are underdeveloped 
(Krugman, 1979; Salant and Henderson, 1978).  
Recently, several financial liberalization indices have been proposed (for example, see 
Bandiera et al., 2000; Edison and Warnock, 2003 and Abiad and Mody, 2005). These indices can 
be used to proxy financial development in the analysis of regime choice.  
 
2.4 Political ideology 
A new line of research is now focusing on various political aspects as potential 
determinants of regime choice. Alesina and Wagner (2003) argue that the low quality of legal 
and political institutions is associated with poor economic management and it affects the choice 
of a regime. Berger et al. (2000) and Edwards (1996) argue that political instability tends to 
increase the likelihood of exchange rate flexibility.  
The contribution of political institutions to economic policy outcomes is an important area 
of research. Divided (coalition) governments or checks and balances are thought to have 
conflicting influences on economic development. One line of research suggests that they 
encourage budget deficits and delay reactions to crisis (Rubini and Sachs, 1989). Another line of 
research finds that they increase the predictability and restraint with which governments regulate 
firms and citizens (North and Weingast, 1989). However, it is not clear whether greater  
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competition in contests for political office increases or reduces the likelihood of adopting an 
alternative exchange rate regime. Faced with the prospect of more competitive elections, 
politicians are supposed to be more sensitive to redistributive concerns and less likely to allow 
exchange rate uncertainty. Hence, several variables ranging from indices of electoral 
competitiveness to the vote shares of parties and directly elected executives permit cross-country 
empirical investigations into questions whether they influence the choice of a currency regime. 
This survey reflects that various factors receive considerations over time to guide regime 
choices. It seems that most of the existing studies suffer from omitted variable bias as the studies 
do not consider all these factors in the analysis of regime choice. For example, political economy 
studies often do not consider economic or financial factors, while international finance studies do 
not often take political factors into account in the analysis. Therefore, a comprehensive analysis 
is required for better understanding of the regime choice. 
 
3.0  The “Bipolar View” or “Hollowing Out Hypothesis” 
The hollowing out hypothesis or the bipolar view predicts a movement toward a fixed or a 
freely floating regime in the face of high capital mobility. This view became popular in the 
1990s when many emerging countries faced crisis with an intermediate regime. Advocates of the 
bipolar view argue that greater exposure to global capital markets makes intermediate exchange 
rate regimes such as adjustable peg, crawling peg and crawling band susceptible to speculative 
attacks. Countries will be forced to move to the corners, either to a fixed regime such as currency 
union, currency board or dollarization, or to a freely floating regime (Eichengreen, 1994; 
Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995; Summers, 2000). In the view of these authors, intermediate regime  
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will be hollowing out over time as a result of involuntary transitions
2. Despite its initial 
popularity, the bipolar view has not escaped criticism. Various case studies show that transitions 
occur not just away from an intermediate regime, but also toward it. 
A Markov chain model that can analyze the probability of regime transitions can be applied 
for testing the validity of the bipolar view. Thus, using Markov chains, Masson (2001) estimates 
the transition probabilities between regimes and finds that over the period 1980-99, there is a 
non-zero probability of transition toward the intermediate regime. Based on this finding, Masson 
rejects the hollowing out hypothesis.  
Masson and Ruge-Murcia (2005) investigate the determinants of regime transitions under a 
Markov chain model. They investigate the effects of inflation, output growth, trade openness and 
reserve on the probability of exchange rate regime transitions. They conclude that inflation, and, 
to a lesser extent, output growth and trade openness help explain the exchange rate regime 
transition dynamics, but not necessarily toward the bipolar direction.  
To have a better understanding of the bipolar view, it is necessary to endogenize transition 
intensities with possible explicit causes of transition such as crisis and developmental stage. 
Moreover, if possible it can be investigated whether the intermediate regimes will be hollowing 
out with or without the effect of crisis. However, considering the volume of works on regime 
choice (static choice), the empirical studies that seek to explain dynamics of regime transition are 




                                                 
2 This view is variously called, “the corners hypothesis”, “the two poles view”, “hollowing out hypothesis” and “the vanishing 
middle”.  
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4.0  The Choice of Exchange Rate Regime in Emerging Economies 
This section reviews some recent studies that focus on the regime choices in emerging 
economies, particularly in East Asia. The collapse of the exchange rate regime in emerging 
countries in the late 1990s has led to a surge in researches on regime choice. 
In the context of crises in 1997/98, some economists recommend that adoption of a common 
basket with G-3 currencies (the US dollar, the Japanese yen, and the euro) would help achieve 
both flexibility and stability in East Asia (Kawai and Takagi, 2000; Ogawa and Ito, 2002 and 
others). With this point, some Japanese economists recommend to increase the weight of the yen 
in the basket of these countries (for example, Ogawa and Ito, 2002). However, Lincoln (2004) is 
not in favor of giving more weight to the Japanese yen in a basket of currencies in East Asia 
because he finds that Japan’s trade links with East Asian economies is very weak and most 
Japanese trade and investment (after the crisis in 1997/98) flows are concentrated in the United 
States and Europe. On the other hand, Frankel (2003) argues that implementation of a basket peg 
is plagued by many problems. He suggests that one leader country should first move to a 
diversified basket, then the others will peg to the leader’s currency.  
McKinnon and Schnabl (2004a, 2004b) and Ohno (1999) are less enthusiastic about basket 
pegging. Their view is that basket pegging cannot bring more stability. McKinnon and Schnabl 
(2004a) see the return of some East Asian countries to dollar pegging after the crisis as rational 
because of the importance of dollar invoicing of much of international trade. 
The possibility of adopting a currency union in East Asia is also explored. Leaders of the 
ASEAN agreed to study the feasibility of a common ASEAN currency system in the 1998 Hanoi 
meeting and included it in the agenda of the Hanoi Action Plan (Business Times, Singapore, 
December 15, 1998). Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1999a and 1999b) concluded that East Asia  
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may be as close to—or  rather, as far away from—being an optimum currency area as Western 
Europe. Kawai and Motonoshi (2004) examined the feasibility of OCA in East Asia by looking 
at the cross-country correlations of various macroeconomic and financial indicators. They argue 
that the whole East Asia—the ASEAN+3 (Japan, China and Korea) and Hong Kong and Taiwan, 
does not qualify for an OCA. But, a subgroup of East Asian countries may qualify for an OCA. 
However, the issue of a monetary union should not be dismissed immediately even if the 
countries in a certain geographic region do not conform to the traditional OCA criteria. Rather, 
these countries should think about whether they are ready to stand on a financial vulnerability 
versus monetary independence trade off (Alexander, Melitz and Furstenberg, 2004).  
Edwards (2000) provides a set of general suggestions about exchange rate regime choice in 
emerging economies. He suggests that countries with pegged regime should prepare an exit 
strategy. To maintain freely floating, Edwards extend the view that the country in question must 
continue its efforts to maintain fiscal balance, modernize its banking sector and accumulate a 
strong international reserve position.  
5.0  Divergence from De Jure Regimes: A Big Challenge? 
The empirical analysis of the choice of exchange rate regime depends on the classification 
of regimes. But explaining the choice of a regime appears to be difficult at the beginning since 
the classification of a regime is problematic. The IMF has traditionally offered a classification 
which is “de jure”, that is, it is essentially based on what the countries report to the IMF. As a 
result, it does not reflect the actual regime when countries diverge from their officially 
announced regime for certain periods of time. It is therefore a big challenge for empirical 
analysis to derive a valid conclusion on the regime choice with certain amount of divergence. 
“This divergence potentially affects the analysis of historical trends in exchange rate regimes,  
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their macroeconomic performance, and the answers to salient policy questions” (Rogoff et al., 
2003; p.7). Therefore, a number of historical de facto regime classifications have been proposed 
based on the actual exchange rate movements (see Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004; Bubula and Ötker 
Robe, 2002; Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2002).  
Using historical data and information on countries’ exchange arrangements, Bubula and 
Ötker-Robe (2002) (BOR) proposed a de facto database going back to 1990 on 190 countries—
they use both annual and monthly qualitative and quantitative information to devise the de facto 
regime classification. The Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) (RR) data set covers 153 countries from 
1940. Their classification is based on a broad set of descriptive statistics and detailed country 
chronologies of exchange rate arrangements to group regimes. According to the authors, the RR 
classification is analogous to natural taxonomic schemes in biology.  It is a long historical 
database on regime classifications, which takes dual and parallel market information into account 
and it is comprehensive in the sense that it reports regime classification on a monthly basis. The 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002) data set contains annual information on 156 countries 
from 1974, but it suffers from many inconclusive data. Note that all de facto classifications 
classify  de facto regimes based on the behavior of three variables: the average of absolute 
monthly changes in nominal exchange rate; the standard deviation of monthly percentage change 
in nominal exchange rate; and, the average of absolute monthly changes in international reserves 
(relative to monetary base). These measures are then used to assign country-years to different 
currency regime categories (fixed, intermediate and floating). 
Recent studies seem enthusiastic about using these de facto classifications to analyze 
exchange rate regime choices or consequences. Now the question arises as to whether the results 
derived from earlier studies based on only de jure regime classification have to be renewed.  
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Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002) argued that none of the classifications is entirely satisfactory. 
While de jure classification has certain limitations, de facto classifications are also not free from 
misclassification errors because of their backward-looking nature. In this debate, it is necessary 
to investigate the amount of divergence and the possibility of misclassification in de facto 
classifications. In Table 1, the amount of divergence between de jure and de facto classifications 
are estimated. According to BOR, around 12 percent of de jure floaters in fact operated 
intermediate regimes. But, according to the RR classification, this percentage is around 40 
percent for the 1980s and 50 percent for the 1990s. In addition, these differences in estimates 
between RR and BOR indicate that there is a possibility of misclassification while authors’ 
determine a de facto regime. 
Table 1.  Divergence between de jure and de facto exchange rate regime classifications 
A.  De jure vs. BOR de facto (1990-1999) 
Divergence 
from\to 
De facto  Total 
observations 
De jure    Fixed                      Intermediate                        Float   
1 336  77  414  Intermediate 
(0.20%) (81.20%) (18.60%)  (100%) 
Float  1 109  315  425 
  (0.20%) (12.09%)  (74.10%)  (100%) 
B.  De jure vs. RR de facto (1980-1989, 1990-99) 
Divergence 
from\to 
                                      De facto  Total 
observations 
De jure           Fixed                     Intermediate                Float   




































Notes: 1. Estimates are based on total number of observations. Row percentages are reported. These are   
              author’s estimation.  2. Underline indicates consensus (consistent) regime. 
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Why do certain countries diverge from the de jure regime? A few studies comprising of a 
small literature attempt to answer this question. For example, according to the fear of floating 
literature (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002; Hausman et al., 2000), countries with high unhedged 
foreign currency denominated debt or high exchange rate risk exposure have an incentive to peg 
even if they are officially floating. Inability to hedge, in turn, usually reflects the inability of 
these countries to borrow abroad in their own currency, also known as the “original sin 
hypothesis”
 3 (Eichengreen and Hausman, 1999). On the other hand, some countries are in fear of 
pegging—a fear that pegging would invite speculative attacks as a result of destabilizing 
misalignment (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2002; Genberg and Swoboda, 2005). 
Alesina and Wagner (2006) formally investigate the reasons of divergence. They find that 
countries that announce a fixed exchange rate but float de facto have relatively “bad” legal and 
policy institutions, whereas countries that fix de facto but float de jure have “good” institutions. 
Genberg and Swoboda (2005) have pointed out some problems of devising a correct de facto 
classification. For example, they argue that exchange rate stability in a floating regime is not 
always a result of intervention; it may be the result of optimally chosen monetary policies. 
Similarly, countries that use monetary policy instruments actively to stabilize their exchange rate 
may not want to announce a fixed exchange regime because of the fear of speculative attacks.  
From the discussion above it may be concluded that we should not ignore de jure regime 
classification as it in principle reflects countries’ preferences for a particular regime. Rather, 
realizing the reasons of gap between official announcement and what countries are practicing is 
crucial for increasing our understanding of the determinants of regime choice. Moreover, it is 
                                                 
3 Although developed countries are able to borrow overseas in their domestic currencies, many developing countries are unable to 
do so. Any large depreciation of the domestic currency increases ‘liability dollarization’ and leads to calamitous real sector 
effects (so-called ‘balance sheet’ effects).   
  15
necessary to investigate whether short-term divergence has any implication for long-term trends 
in regime choice.  
 
6.0  Conclusion 
This study has attempted to shed new light on some areas of research  in the foreign 
exchange regime choice by analyzing over 40 years of empirical work. Four topics that gained 
considerable attention in the past years, or will play an increasing role in future research, are 
covered.  
First, we have attempted to identify determinants of static regime choice considering 
economic fundamentals, shocks, financial development and political ideology. It is highlighted 
that the role of these factors is changing over time in the choice of a regime. It is found that most 
of the existing studies suffer from omitted variable bias as they do not consider all these factors 
together to analyze the choice of a regime. Second, we analyzed the rationales behind the 
“bipolar view” of regime choice and how this view can be empirically tested. No consensus has 
emerged on this view. It can be argued from the survey that the area of research using dynamic 
model is still at infancy stage and more efforts and sophistication are required for testing the 
validity of the bipolar view. Third, we looked at the choice of currency regime in emerging 
countries with particular emphasis on East Asia because many East Asian countries faced crisis 
in the 1990s with the adoption of particular intermediate regime. Emerging countries seem to be 
cautious in choosing corner regimes. Fourth, we touch upon a relatively new topic in the foreign 
exchange literature: divergence between de jure and de facto exchange rate regime, its causes 
and consequences. As the divergence is likely to affect the results, it is important to investigate 
whether this short-term divergence has implication for long-term regime choice.  
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It is not clear in the literature whether the distribution of exchange rate regimes tends to 
converge to the polar extremes and what factors increase the likelihood of convergence. 
Countries, particularly emerging and less developed countries move back and forth between 
corner and intermediate regimes. Level of development, both economic and financial, seems 
important for the choice of a polar regime. Therefore, it emanates from the literature that 
exchange rate regime choice cannot be a once-and-for-all.  
In essence, the choice of an exchange rate regime is not straightforward and to be sure, 
there will be continuous revisions of theories and empirical results. A dynamic analysis of 
regime transition with possible explicit causes taking the probability of regime misclassification 
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